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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
ELEC'l'ORS OF THE PROPOSED
BODY CORPORATE, OF THE TOWN
OF COTTONWOOD CITY,

Petitio11ers,

vs.

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SALT LAKE
COUNTY. et al.
Respondents,
and

Case No.

12748

WALKER E. ANDERSON FOR
HIMSELF AND ALL PERSONS
SIM.ILARLY SITUATED AND
THOSE OPPOSED TO THE PETITION MANDAMUS, WRIT AND
TOWN INCORPORATION,

lntervenors.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an action in mandamus to
compel the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake County
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to approve Appellants' petition for incorporation of the
proposed Town of Cottonwood City, under the requirements of Section 10-2-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.

DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge of the
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, heard the matter before the
court and ruled Appellants had failed to show Respondents had acted arbitrarily or improperly or abused
their discretion. The court found Respondents actions
were based upon substantial reasonable grounds and
for the best interests and welfare of a majority of
Salt Lake County residents. Further, that said statute
in question does not impose mandatory duty upon Respondents to act. Said court therefore denied Appellants' Writ of Mandamus and dismissed the case with
prejudice.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondent seeks reaffirmance of the lower
court's decision denying Appellants request for a Writ
of Mandamus which attempts to compel the Respondent,
as a matter of law, to approve the petition of Appellant.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants filed with Respondents a Petition for
incorporation of the Town of Cottonwood City on or
about the 28th day of September, 1971. Said petition
purportedly was signed by a majority of the electors
of the proposed town and pursuant to statutory authority; both of which allegations the Respondents take
exception to and contend are false. A legal description
of the area was attached to the petition filed which
appeared to comply with the statutory requirements but
the map as submitted was very rough drawn.
On or about October 4, 1971, Respondents held a
public hearing on Appellant's petition together with a
petition submitted to Respondents in opposition to
Appellants. Respondents received testimony and arguments from both the proponents and the opponents to
the incorporation of said Town of Cottonwood City.
Respondens for good and reasonable cause denied Appellants' request. Respondents reasons for denial are based
upon failure to comply with the statute permitting the
incorporation of said town, together with the statutory
requirement that Respondents protect the general health,
welfare and general good of the residents of Salt Lake
County, State of Utah.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS STATUTORY
DUTIES IN THE INCORPORATION OF TOWNS IS
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CONTAINED IN SECTION 10-2-6, UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED, AND THE INTERPRETATION OF
SAID SECTION, AND NOT BY MANDAMUS.

Counties receive their power and authority from
the Constitution and statutes of the state. Some powers
are expressed and others implied. Some statutes are
very specific as to detail and particularity and others
are rather broad and general with much left to the
agencies and bodies who are to carry out the laws within
the guidelines set forth by the legislature.
Municipal corporations possess and exercise only
such powers as are expressely conferred or those necess-arily or fairly implied or those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and purposes of the
corporation. Generally, what the state may do directly,
it may authorize its municipalities to. Where power
over a particular subject matter has been delegated to
a municipal corporation by the legislature,
any
express limitations, the extent to which that power shall
be exercised rests in the discretion of the municipal
authorities and as long as it is exercised in good faith
and for a municpal purpose, the courts have no ground
upon which to interfere. 56 Am. Jnr. 2d (Municipal
Corporations) sec. 227.
When the courts do interfere in matters of municipal
functions, mandamus is a proper proceeding. However,
the Writ of Mandamus will issue ·only where there is
a showing of abuse of discretion which must appear
to be very clear before the court will interfere. State
vs. Bunge, 73 P. 2d 516. If said acts complained of are
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solely discretionary, the courts will not interfere to
compel performance of said acts. (Hasla.m vs. Morrison,
113 U. 14) Thus, the courts will not substitute their
own thoughts in discretionary matters for those of the
municipal officers. The courts may not agree with the
results and other actions taken, but if discretionary,
the courts will not interfere. (52 Arn. Jur. 2d - Mandamus sec. 78)
Section 10-2-6, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides
the method by which towns are incorporated in the
State of Utah, providing as follows:
"Whenever a majority of the electors of any
Unincorporated Town having a population of not
less than one hundred and less than seven thousand desire to have said town incorporated they
may file a petition for the purpose with the Board
of County Commissioners, stating the legal description and boundaries of the territory desired
to be incorporated. On approval of such petition
by said board and the filing of a copy thereof
with the County Recorder such town shall constitute a body corporate and politic under the name
and style proposed. The Board of County Commissioners shall appoint the first president and
Board of Trustees, who shall appoint the first
president and Board of Trustees, who shall hold
office until the next municipal election and until
their successors are elected and qualified." (emphasis added)
62 CJS Municipal Corporations, section 111, sets
forth the general rule as to powers and functions granted
to municipal corporations as follows: The functions of
a municipal corporation may be either imperative or
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discretionary and whether any particular power or dutv
is mandatory, permissive, or discretionary, is purely
question of legislative intent. Imperative or mandatorv
functions must be performed. Usually the
functions are imposed by words of imperative form as
"shall" or "must'' in the statute. All other than imperative duti.es are discretionary functions of the m111nicipality. (emphasis added) Clearly, the statute 10-2-6, Utah
Code Annotated must be considered and controls. The
key to this grant of power in the matter herein comes
from the words "On approval of such petition by the
said Board." This foregoing sentence contains none of
the "imperative form words such as shall or must." In
fact, this sentence is clearly the opposite when it states
"On approval." There is no forced language or mandatory action required on the language.
Checking the history of Title 10, Chapter 2 Utah
Code Annotated, indicates sections one through six were
all originally enacted together as part of an overall
package relating to the creation of cities and towns.
Every one of these six sections in Title 10, Chapter 2
of the Utah Code are full of the "imperative form words
such as shall." The mandatory word shall appears in
nearly every sentence in all six of these sections, including section 6. Interestingly however, when the language
of the statute in section 6 considered the issue of acting
upon the petition, no mandatory words appear but only
the words "On Approval." "On approval of such petition by the Board (of County Commissioners)" surely
conveys no mandatory meamng or forced actions for
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approval. In fact, it would very logically follow that
the board may not approve and if it did not approve,
it must in accordance with its general grant of power not
approve for good and sufficient reasons and not for
any arbitrary and/or capricous cause. The powers and
functions of municipal corporations are always to be
considered ·with respect to the pitrpose and object of
the creation and existence of the corporation, namely
the welfare and best good of the public. They are not
established for the exclusive advantage of the corporations but for the public at f,a,rge. (Nourse v. City of
Russellville, 78 SW 761; and Herbert v. Benson., 2 La.
Ann. 770: and 62 CJS Municipal Corporations section
106)
Municipal corporations are primarily incorporated
as political subdivisions of the state for the purpose
of performing local governmental fimctions in the interest of the public order, health, safety, welfare and are
divided into two general classes of powers, governmental
and proprietary. The governmental functions of a municipal corporation are those conferred or imposed upon
it as a local agency to be exercised not only in the
interest of its inhabitants but also in advancement of
the public good or welfare as affecting the public generally. They include the promotion of public peace,
health, safety, and morals as well as the expenditure of
money. (56 Am. Jud. 2d Municipal Corporations section
199). The powers which a municipal corporation may
exercise are intended to be used for the advantage of
the public and the inhabitants generally and not for the
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particular advantage of one individual or group or individuals. (5G Arn. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations seetion 229).

It is readily apparent that the Respondents have
been charged with the interest of the whole county. Their
interest must be directed towards public purposes and
interest. Generally, a pnblic purpose has for its objective the promotion of public health, safety, morals, general security, prosperity, and contentment of all the
inhabitants or residents within the municipal corporation (5G Am. Jur. 2d Municipal Corporations section
230). Thus, the purposes, powers, functions and overall
reasons for even creating a municipal corporation boil
down to the same general goals and objectives of public
good.
With the goals and objectives of municipalities to
be as aforestated, it seems logical to determine the legislative intent to permit the board of county commissioners to consider the petitions as submitted and consider same in the light of the test for the good of all
of the public. It does not seem logical that the board
would be intended to be a rubber stamp upon receipt
of a petition. Some inquiry must be made by someone
to determine if the public good was being met. The
drafters of sections one through six of Chapter 2 surely
knew and used to great lengths the mandatory words in
all six sections, except for the key words of section six
as it relates to approval of said petition.
This section herein in question has been m effect
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since 1898 with the only change being a reduction from
two hunderd to one hundred people to permit incorporation. In all this time, we can find not Utah cases in point
in interpreting the working of section 10-2-6. It is admitted that there is much case law in most other jurisdictions in the area of incorporation of towns and cities,
but the wording of their statutes are different than
Utah's and therefore said cases would shed little light
as to how the Utah Supreme Court ought to interpret
this section herein in question. However, it is submitted
that the clear import of the wording would not make the
Board of County Commissioners a rubber stamp.
POINT II
APPELLANTS HAVE FAILED TO ESTABLISH
THAT THEY HAVE IN FACT COMPLIED WITH
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR INCORPORATION OF A TOWN AS PRESCRIBED BY
SECTION 10-2-6, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.

Appellants have contended that the Respondent
Board is without any authority or power to even investigate or look into or consider facts surrounding proposed
incorporations after the Petition has been submitted.
With this position Respondent disagrees. We cannot
agree that section 10-2-6, Utah Code Annotated, sets
forth such guidelines that require the board of county
commissioners to exercise no function other than rubber
stamping an approval for incorporation if a Petition
is once submitted to it. The courts have uniformly
held that the legislature may delegate the power to
determine facts and circumstances that have taken place
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to courts, agencies, and boards without violating the
principle and ma.xim delegatus non protest delegare.
These acts are not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power. The creation of municipal corporations is in absence of limitation a legislative function.
The legislature may not only create and provide for the
organization of cities and towns but may restrict some
of their powers. (McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,
Vol. 1, section 3 :03) The legislature can create genera},
laws and grant to a court, tribunal, commission, board
or such other agency the right to ascertain and determine if and when the general provisions of law are
complied with . . . this also is not in violation of the
maxim delegatns non protest delegare. (Hill v. Kahoka,
35 Fed. 32: McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 1,
page 514) It is not an unauthorized delegation of legislative power to pass a law and impose on some officer
or official body the duty to determine whether such conditions exist as are prescribed by said general law.
(Bo.ard of Directors of Northern Wasco Co. People Utility District v. Kelly, 137 P. 2d 295) The foregoing general law has been well accepted in Utah for many years
and set forth in the case of In Re Fullmer, 33 U. 43,
when the court determined it permissable to delegate
powers to courts by general laws for the purpose of
determination of the facts and events that had transpired ... without declaring this a delegation of legislative power and thus an improper and void act.
In the case before the court, the legislature in 10-2-6
Utah Code Annotated has passed an act setting forth
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some very specific facts that must be determined and
has further left some questions for determination to
the board of county commissioners for determination
under the general grants of powers, functions, and purposes which created the municipalities under the test
heretofore discussed of general public welfare and best
good. Thus, a petition was filed with Respondents; a
map and/or plat accompanied said petition (even though
said map was very rough drawn) ; boundaries were
stated; a legal description was submitted; an allegation
of popultion was alleged within the guidelines of between
one hundred and seven thousand; but then the statutory
requirements stopped. The Petition recited that petitioners constituted a "majority of the electors" of the
area . . . but with this contention the Respondents do
not agree. Further, there was nothing identifying the
area in question as qualifying as an "unincorporated
town" as the statute requires.
The question of whether the petition contains "a
majority of the electors" will now be considered. Appellant contends that an elector is a person over 21 years
of age, who is a citizen of the United States for ninety
days, and who has resided, in Utah for one year, in the
county four months, and in the precinct sixty days and
contends authority for this position from the Constitution of Utah, Art. IV, Sec. 2. This position Respondents
disagree with and submit is not supported by the case
law and reasonable interpretation of the Utah statutes.
At the outset, the section of the constitution which
Appellant relies upon for its authority does not mention

11

one word about an elector. This section is titled qualifications to vote and sets forth some qualification. Sections 3, 4, and 5 of article IY of the constitution must
also be considered as well as other statutes of the state
and the case law for proper definitions to this term
Elector. Y.,T e would submit that if section 2 of article IV
is all inclusive and sets forth the full definition, then
why did the framers of the constitution enact section 5,
article IV, and set forth the proposition that Electors
are to be citizens of the United Statrs. Section 2 already
requires the qualifications to be that of "Every Citizen
of the U.S." It is obvious that section 2 is not intended
as the definition of an Elector bnt only constitutional
guidelines for qiwlif ications to vote ... as is stated.
Section 20-2-29, Utah Code Annotated sets forth
additional requirements for "Qualifications to vote" stating registration is a prerequisite to voting. . . . No
person shall hereafter be permitted to vote at any general, special, municipal or school election, or at any
primary election ... without having first been registered.
. . . The constitutionality of registration laws has been
challenged many times and upheld. In Utah, the case of
Earl v.
28 U. 116, held that the Legislature may
rightfully enact a registration law which merely regulates the exercise of the elective franchise and does not
amount to a denial of, or abridge or impair, the right
itself.
Section 20-6-1, Utah Code Annotated sets forth additional requirements for "Qualifications to vote" as it
pertains to voting by absence or physical disability. Said
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section holds that any qualified elector who has complied
with the law in regard to registration, and who on the
day of election is absent from the county or city of
which he is an elector ... and any physically disabled
elector who is confined in a hospital ... or any other
place ... who has complied with the law in regard to
registration, may vote at any election held in such county
or city as herein provided.
Section 20-17-4, Utah Code Annotated sets forth
additional requirements for "Qualifications to vote" for
people in military service by defining . . . the term
elector in military service shall mean any person or
persons qualified as an elector or electors under the
constitution and laws of the State of Utah or, being
eligible for registration would, by registration, be so
qualified. Why would this foregoing section use the
conjunctive form as to one in the military requirement
for electors needing to comply with the Constitution
and laws of the state if only section 2 of article IV of
the constitution set forth all of the definition for electors.
The plain meaning of the constitution and statutes of the
state must be considered we would submit.

In an effort to further unscramble the definition
of the key word, Elector, Blacks Law Dictionary, 4th
Edition, gives the definition of elector as "a duly qualified voter; one who has the vote in the choice of any
officer; a constituent. The case law definition of said
term elector states one who elects or has the right of
choice or who has the right to vote for any functionary
or for the adoption of any measure. (DeBanche v. City
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of Greenbay, 277 NW 147, 148) Aczel vs. United States,
232 F. 652, 657, defines elector in a narrower sense, one
who has the general right to vote and the right to vote
for public officers, one authorized to exercise their elective franchise. McEvoy v. Christensen, 159 NW 179, 181,
held although the term electors and voters are sometimes
used interchangeably, the meaning is not precisely the
same. Electors being properly applied to all those e1Y1Jtitled to vote, whereas voters appropriately designate
only those actually voting.
The majo6ty rule seems to hold that the definition
of an eletcor is one qualified to vote. In the case of
School District v. Cook, 424 P. 2d 751, 759, the court
held that until a person qualified to exercise the privilege of voting actiially takes advantage of his franchise,
he does not become cm elector. K uhrt v. Sitlley Cownty
Board 176 NW2d 479, 481, holds an elector includes
not only those persons who vote, but also those who are
qualified and who fail to exercise their rights of franchise. Citizenship and residence alone do not make one
an Elector but an elector is one who is qualified to vote
held Donovan v. Comerford, 162 NE 657. Grossen v. Registrar 59 So. 2d 461, 463, held an elector was a person
duly qualified to vote, regardless of whether he has
exercised his right to vote. The Arizona case of Ahrens
v. Kerby 37 P. 2d 375, 378, defined the term qwalified
electors and electors as used throughout constitidional
and statutory provisions governing initiative and referendum petitions to be synonymous so as to require all
persons sigwing petitions to comply with registration
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law before doing so. Other jurisdictions have required
the signers of petitions to be registered. State v. Dwnn,
235 P. 132; and Coney v. Topeka, 149 P. 689.

62 C.JS, :Municipal Corporation, section 17 (b) sets
forth the general rule that statutory requirements as to
the number and qualifications of the signers of petitions
be fully met. The petitioners
actually and bona
fidely possess the required qualifica:tions i,n their own
right at the date of the filing of the petition. Since
the names to a petition basically is a major step in
granting jurisdiction in the area for which the peti tion
is prepared, it is obviously imperatve that the signers
do properly fit into that basic category designated by
the statute.
1

The "town" as described in Appellant's petition was
represented to have a population of 153 of which 94
are adults and 59 children. Ninety four (94) was set
forth by Appellant to be the total electors in the proposed new town and 57 was set forth to be the number
and majority of Electors on the petition of Appellants.
However, when the Salt Lake County Clerk's Office
checked the named petitioners with the Registration
Records, there were only 17 on Appellant's Petition
who were registered to vote, but 47 registered voters on
the opposition petition . . . clearly being no majority
of the electors for incorporation as that statute requires.
In fact, some of the signers of Appellants petition were
also signed on the petition filed with Respondents by
those in opposition to Appellants petition and who would
be in the class of Intervenors herein. At this time,
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Respondents are without information as to which side
of this issue some petitioners are on since their names
appear on both proponents and opponents petition. Since
the law is clear that one may withdraw his name from
a petition at any time prior to the time that said petition has been acted upon, Respondents are put in the
position of making factual determinations in this maJtter
&nd not serving as a rnbbe1' stamp m; Appellants would
desire them to do. In Aukanip v. Diehm, 8 A. 2d 400, 401,
the court considered the question of granting a liquor
license based upon a signed petition by 25% of the
electors ... the court held the word "Elector" is used
in the sense of one qualified to vote at the election and
therefore one who at the time of signing the petition
was a registered voter . ... Otherwise, the commissioners
(Board of County Commissioners) have no way of ascertainimg whether the requisite number of signers of the
petition are electors. This is the exact dilemma here
before the court. How can the board of county commissioners determine if one is an elector without checking the registration records to determine such 1 The
mere fact one asserts in a petition that he or she is an
elector does not make it so. Other than the voter registration records, we would submit there would be no
reasonable way to check ones qualifications as an elector.
Thus, it appears to Respondents that one must be registered to be qualified to vote; an elector being required
to be qualified to vote also logically requires that one
to be an elector must be registered with the county clerk
in the State of Utah.
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The second exception raised by Respondents to
Appellants compliance to the statutory requirements of
section 10-2-6, Utah Code Annotated, is the issue of
whether Appellants qualify as an unincorporated town.
It is recognized that the term "Town" has a different meaning in different jurisdictions. Historically,
the word town originated for a change in the orthography . . . and evolved from the Anglo-Saxon word
"tun" meaning an enclosure. This word has developed
a more comprehensive meaning in the United States
and has generally been used to denote a collection of
inhabited houses or a hamlet between a village and a
city in size, located at a certatin place. Said place has
been considered to be a closely populated place whether
incorporated or not as distinguished from the county
or from rural communities. (56 Am. Jur. 2d, Municipal
Corpora:tions, section 76) The case of T.Cl!!Jlor v. Edison,
13 SW 263 held that a town was an aggregation of
people living in very close proximity.
It became necessary to distinguish towns as to incorporated and unincorporated since there became many
areas with people living in very close proximity and
designated as a certain place which was very identifiable
but which chose not to be incorporated. Thus, statutes
were enacted to permit towns in some jurisdictions to
operate under some laws as incorporated towns but still
remain and be unincorporated. Thus, these statutes became known as unincorporated town statutes and specifically granted to these areas the right to govern and
rule themselves as a closely held interest group with
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common goals and objectives without being incorporated. .Many of these unincorporated town acts were
abandoned as the population grew. The act herein in
question was originally enacted in 1884 while Utah was
under the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. In 1898
the Revised Statutes of Utah, Section 299 approved the
incorporation of towns as first enacted and said law
has been brought down to the present time without any
substantial revisions or changes (Woodring v. Straup,
45 U. 173). In the late 1800's the language as to the
town and its being incorporated or unincorporated at
this time had a very distinct meaning. Thus, the general rule and definition of an unincorporated town was
considered to be any large collection of houses and
buildings, public and private, constituting a Distrwt
place with a name and not incorporated as a city. (62
CJS, Municipal Corporation, section 64)
The courts have held that the term unincorporated
town was one specifically created by Legislative enactment. It was intended to apply to a specific category of
area, being to establish a town government for those
certain communities which were not incorporated but
assumed .fJJ government as a town. The courts determined that terms used in statutes must be given their
plain, ordinary meaning unless such meaning was inconsistent with the manifest intention of the statutory provisions that one was construing. Thus, the term uwincorporated when used to describe land area of a county
ordinarily would mean part of the county outside of
incorporated cities. (City of Olivette v. Graeler, 338
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SW 2d 827) The case of Board of Commissioners of
Nye County vs. Schmidt, 157 P. 1073 specifically referred to unincorporated town governments in their
sta;tutes and the court held that the law will not allow
a revocation or aleration of a statute by construction
when the words have their proper construction without
it. The court indicated that said term unincorporated
town applied to certain communities which were not
incorporated, but that did in fact assume and operate
a government as a town. Said court reaffirmed the
common and well followed rule of statutory construction that requires a court to avoid interpretations when
that result would result in an absurd consequence and/or
contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language.
Clearly the word town and city carries with it the idea
of a considerable aggregation of people living in close
proximity with each other in a community or in a collective body of inhabitants. (Holguin v. Villalobos, 212
SW 2d 498) (Congregation of Sisters v. Glassell, 20 So.
2d 923). These areas ought to be politically and socially
an aggregation of people living in close proximity, (Cunningham v. Seattle, 84 P. 641) and ought to be distinguished from the country or rural areas that appear
as communities. (Denver v. Coulehan, 39 P. 425)
The terms city and town have on many occasions as
it relates to the use herein in question been used interchangably and have been construed to possess the same
relative requirements. These words imply a unity and
continuity of territory. The words imply that this territory have an idea of compactness, unity and continuity

19

and an assemblage of inhabitants living in the vicinity
of each other. (62 CJS, Municipal Corporation, section 9). 56 Am. Jnr. 2d, Municipal Corporations, section 19, sets forth the proposition that the term city 1
ordinarily indicates a municipal corporation of the largest and highest class ... generally possessing a municipal court and other administration of local affairs ...
created for municipal purposes, because it is a miniature
government, having legislative, executive and judicial
powers. It is a public institution for self government
and local administration of the affairs of state. Thus,
in Chesapeake v. Silver Grove (249 SW 2d 520), the
court held that the words city and town imply that the
real estate incorporated should be reasonably susceptible '
to municipal developrnent and that some benefits will
be returned to the incorporated area.

It is submitted that the area in question herein does
not possess the qualities set forth above. By nearly
every test given, there appears to be little relationship
to the requirement of an unincorporated town. The
area of Salt Lah County encompassing the "Cottonwood Area" was well established long prior to the time
when the Cottonwood Mall (a commercial business area)
was established. This area consists of considerable residential areas and covers a large geographical area. The
Appellnts herein have taken a very limited number of
properties immediately snrronnding the Cottonwood
Mall consisting of several apartment houses as the total
boundary are:a for their proposed city. Upon looking
at the map of the proposed boundaries of said city, it
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appears that the dividing lines for said city separate
properties of like kind and description and use. Respondents can in no way determine any reason why one
property in the very same area was included and their
neighbor next door was excluded except for the factor
or need on Appellants part to gain enough signers for
their petition. The people who have been excluded are
in just as close proximity to each other and the Appellants as those people who are included. The area that
has been excluded is as populated and developed as the
area included except there are no commercial developments like the Cottonwood Mall. The properties immediately surrounding the Cottonwood Mall Shopping Center is no more identifiable to the Mall than the neighbors
surrounding said area that have been excluded. The
distinct name designation test does not apply any differently to the included area than the excluded area.
There has never been any assumd town government nor
any ccmmunity development in this entire area.
The people included and excluded attend the same
churches and participate in the same political districts,
thus showing no distinction as to the political or social
tests which a town possesses. There are no barriers
(either natural or artificial) between the included and
excluded area. In fact, the boundary lines cut down the
middle of streets with similarity of property on both
sides of the street, cutting between property lines of
abutting neighborhood property with similar houses on
each property, and contains very irregular and protruding boundary lines so as to include and exclude those
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specific properties that are favorable or unfavorable
I
to Appellants position. In short, the facts are that the l.
area excluded and included are the same, with similar .
l
type and quality, homes, possessing the same degree of,
compactness, unity and continuity with assemblages of
1
inhabitants living in close proximity to each other with
1
intermingled social and politi0al interests. The included ,
area is a very small portion of territory comprising a '
larger unincorporated inhabited area of Salt Lake :
County.
Respondents therefore respectfully submit that the
area does not meet any of the tests used to establish
an unincorporatd town, save it be the fact the area is
not incorporated.

c

POINT III
APPELLANTS PROPOSED CITY IS NOT IN THE
BEST INTEREST OF ALL OF THE COMMUNITY,
IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY AND IS CONTRARY
TO THE GENERAL LAW AS TO GUIDELINES FOR
CREATION OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

A general discussion of principles to be considered <
in the creation of Municipal Corporations is contained
in 62 CJS, Municipal Corporations, section 7, setting
forth overall considerations which must be resolved to
properly create said corporation. It is well recognized €
that a body seeking incorporation as a municipal corporation must show itself to be substantially within the
terms of the legislative requirements. The general good c
of an entire community must be considered however. a
The word "community" was not necessarily confined c
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bleto th e propose d corporat·10n i·mu·ts m
· cons1·dermg
·
the
he·
f
t.
h
' issue o promo mg t e general good of the communitv
lar in the case of Virginia Bennett v. Garrett (112 SE 772).
of Thus, where corporation limits are carved out of a
of thickly settled section, it must be construed as embracing
ctb the whole section with consideration given to those reed siding without as well as those residing within the proa posed limits of the community. The question is, will
ke the advantages to the whole overbalance the disadvantages.

he
The population and territory of a proposed munish cipal corporation must be carefully considered in cre1s ating Municipal Corporations. 62 CJS, Municipal Corporations, section 8, discusses questions as to population and affirms that such questions are within the
province of the legislature with minimum numerical requirements being mandatory to follow. In determining
whether the requisite population exisits, only act'UJ(J)l
residents should be counted with temporary sojourners
being excluded from the count. The legislature may
id or may not impose density requirements of certain popuid lation per square mile, but the area incorporated must
The
1g bear a just proportion to the population included.
;o power to establish a municipality cannot lawfully be
d exercised where the population is absurdly disproporr- tionate in numbers to the area defined by boundaries .

.e
The term "Municipal Corporation" implies the
d organization of a certain geographical district under
r. authority of law, including within its jurisdiction and
d control a certan geographical area; territory being an
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indispensible elemPnt of the existence of a municipal
corporation. Where the statute fix0s no limitations as
to territory requirenwnts, no hard and fast rules can
be laid down as to the extent of territory which may
be incorporated as a municipality, but such cases must
be determined largely according to its own facts. The
area incorporated should be suitable for municipal pur.
poses, reasonably
to nmnicipal development
and so conditioned to be subject to municipal govern·
ment. Consideration must be given to what benefits
may be returned to the lands or the inhabitants thereof.
It has been held that the art>a must be of such size that
the inhabitants may be said to have such human or social
contact as to create a community of public interest and
duty requiring, in consideration of the general welfare,
an organized governmental agency for the management
of their local affairs of a quasi public natnre. Reasonable expected growth of the mundcipality is needed. The
word city implies nnity, cont£nn£ty of territory, compactness, co11tinitity, and an assemblage of inhabitants
living in the vicinity of each other. The bisection of a
city or thickly settlt>d c01mmrnity will be carefully considered. Where the only apparent purpose i::-; to increase
the tax base and/or obtain a sitfficient number of people
necessary to incorporate, grounds to refuse incorporation exist. (62 CJR, Mnpnicipal Corporation, section 9.)
Appellant has attacked the Respondent being anything other than a ruhbt'r stamp in approval for their
petition. Admittedly there is a separation of powers
between th legislative, executive and judicial branches of
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our government but clearly the law is not so rigid and
fixed that the judiciary and executive branch agencies
cannot be vested with the power to determine if facts,
events and circumstances have been met. The Utah
courts have uniformly held that the legislature can delegate power to determine if some facts or events have
been met. Courts and agencies can determine if municipalities have exceeded their powers under the law, and
may inquire into what the law is and whether or not the
law has been violated or complied with. (Yowng v. SaJ,t
Lake City, 24 U 321) The constitution requires the organization of cities and the determination of their boundaries by general laws; they must, as a matter of necessity, become effective by events to happen in the future,
and to determine when such events have happened, the
legislature must provide some tribunal to determine the
facts. The enlargement or restriction of a boundary is
still made by the law as passed and not created by the
fact finder who only determines that the acts, facts and
conditions have been met. Various groups daily determine compliance with laws as passed in determining,
whether conditions have been met. (l\foQnillian, Municipal Corporations, Vol. 1, section 3 :05)
If the legislature in the matter before the court has
failed to give enough specific instructions and guidelines to the general law of 10-2-6, Utah Code Annotated,
to carryout the plain intent of said act of incorporating,
then the board of county commissioners under the general grants of power for public policy and welfare must
be granted the power or else the entire section herein
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in question would be void. If the actions of the Respondents are considered to be discretionary, we would consider such power not as delegation of legislative functions but rather the carrying out of pmver granted to
boards of county commissioners to govern local affairs
in an orderly manner for the best good of the whole of
their jurisdiction and to the best interest and welfal'€
of the citizens as a whole. If said actions of Respondents are considered to be discretionary hut an unconstitutional grant of legislative power, then said section
10-2-6, Utah Code Annotated should be declared to be
void and Appellants then must seek their remedies with
the legislature to enact other legislation setting forth
those guidelines to accomplish their purposes. However, if said actions of Respondents are considered to
be ministerial and the action sought from Respondents
to be mandatory for their performance, then we submit
that said act is void on the basis of public policy considerations that said act would require Respondents to
perform acts clearly absurd is result and disruptive to
the overall governmental operations in the southeast section of Salt Lake County.
The area to be incorporated must possess a reasonably developed conununity center which will be the focal
point for the common social, economic and cultural ties
that need to bind a community. (Scharping v. Johnson,
145 NW 2d 691) The entire area proposed for the city
contains no area for expansion to provide for orderly
governmental growth. There is no area for parks, playgrounds, schools, churches, libraries, civic centers, mo-
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tels, hotels, etc. that are generally attendant to cities.
The only way such future governmental facilities could
be provided would be by annexation proceedings to surrounding areas. Obviously the power struggle would be
on for additional space for expansion. The proposed
city area does not possess any governmental services
that generally are provided for residents of cities;
namely, police protection, fire protection, water, disposal plants, etc., nor faciMies or area to provide the
many services that are now being performed for the
area residents. The disadvantages to Salt Lake County
in having an oasis of a few block area right in the middle
of areas which it provides services to, and probably
would be asked to continue to provide for the area proposed in this new city, could be beyond ones imagination in scope and comprehension to consider. We can
only speculate here but feel compelled to point out some
disadvantages since Appellant has stated that Respondents were without any reasons for their decision of denial
and therefore acted in an arbitrary and capricous
manner.
At the preset time, traffic and parking at the Cottonwood Mall is a serious problem. Additional parking
space is needed to handle overflow traffic congestion.
Respondents would have no control over this problem
for the street area included within said city. 4800 South
Street and Highland Drive are major traffic streets for
Salt Lake County. Parking has been requested upon
these streets during busy times which has been turned
down due to traffic conjestion problems.
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The planning and zoning problems which this area
could create would be ont of the control of Respondents which could be at cross purposes to the Master
Plan of Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning. This
area is so small in size and is situated right in the middle
of a densely populated area of Salt Lake County. Whatever is done in the proposed city area would have a very
direct effect upon the entire surrounding area and the
inhabitants. However, no control nor even right to object nor be heard would vest in area residents who
would be forced to "like it or lump it" when adverse
decisions would be made affecting their interests. Said
area being just so small, there could be no buffer zone
for orderly development.

If Appellants prevail, shopping areas in the entire
valley of Salt Lake County would be best to incorporate
so as to retain total control over the property in the
area and retain the sales tax revenue for their own purposes. Towns ·would appear all over the valley in connection with major commercial developments so as to be
able to retain revenue from sales taxes. We would submit that county government would be nearly destroyed
financially. Counties would be required to provide the
services as they do now, but would not be able to obtain
the proceeds under which to provide said services, except
through very high property tax.
The majority of the property in the area in question
is primarily owned by one person and is under his direct
and total control. Respondents submit this city is pro-
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posed solely for the benefit of selling an electric power
plant which was built by the majority property owner
to the city. The use of this power plant and accompanying rights to sell electricity was denied by the courts
in the case of Cottonwood Mall v. Utah Power <t Light
Company, 440 F. 2d 36.
It is submitted that the legislature in 10-2-6, Utah
Code Annotated, didn't intend to permit creation of cities
and incorporate by only meeting a minimum population
requirement, regardless of any other circumstances.
When the legislature provided that a corporation may
be created, we like the court in Board of Supervisors
of Norfolk County v. Duke, 73 S.E. 456, 459, do not
believe that the act contemplated anything of creation
of a city in the middle of a thickly populated area, "and
when it provides for the incorporation of a thickly
settled community, it does not mean that the community
shall be subdivided in accordance with the caprice and
whim of a limited portion of the people at the disadvantage of the entire community. Great and unnecessary
burdens might be imposed, with great wrong and injury
accomplished under such a construction." In our statute,
no territory requirement is stated but surely the legislature did not intend than a small part of a large area
could be incorporated at least when the large area itself
is suitable for incorporation and the rights of the people
of the large area are affected by the incorporation of

the small area.
Probably the best case in point in opposition to the
incorporation of small sections of larger areas is The
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State of Texas v. Perkins, 360 S.W. 2d 555. Over one.
half of the total towns territory in this case was owned
by one person; as is the case in the matter herein. No
natural barriers separated the proposed town from the
excluded area, as is the case herein. No legal or logical
reasoning existed as to determining the boundary lines,
as is the base herein. Many more residences existed in
the immediately contiguous and surrounding area that
was excluded than the number included, as is the case
herein. Purposes in detennining who was included and
excluded was to gain favorable qualified voters, as is
the case herein. The statutes permitted incorporation
by "Towns and villages" as is the case herein.
The court held that defendant was not a town as
the statutes prescribed. That instead it was only a
portimi of a larger unincorporated, inhabited community, which could not be lawfully incorporated without
including substa•ntially all of the town as it existed at
the time of its purported incorporation. By including
only a small portion of the area, the court found said
boundary to be chosen arbitrarily (unreasonably, not
naturally ... without fair cause or reason) and at the
whim and caprice of those who chose the boundary lines.
As to these actions, the court held that "if the incorporating petitioners do not respect the rights of the inhab·
itants of a major portion of the town or village they
imperil the validity of their acts in attempting to incorporate ... our Legislature has consistently authorized
towns and villages, not jitst an arbitrary slice thereof,
to incorporate." Thus, the conclusion was "Compelled"
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to be reached that the attempt to incorporate was without authority of law and contrary to the public policy
of the state. Furthermore, the court required that the
requisite population must be shown by the Federal Census as last taken, which it wasn't in the Perkins case
nor in the case before the court.
To the foregoing reasoning in Texas v. Perkins, we
can totally agree and endorse and submit to the court to
be the only reasonable, logical conclusion that could be
reached.

CONCLUSION
The lower court found that the Respondents did not
abuse their discretion. We would submit that said conclusion of the lower court is well substantiated by the
foregoing discussion herein. The plan clearly was ill
conceived. The best good of the whole of the community
will not be served, no reasonal basis for the boundaries
exist, the impact upon the County would be most disruptive, considerable problems could arise in the future.
The reasonable meaning of the language of the statute with its fair interpretation to statutory requirements
do not exist, and the statutory requirements for number

31

of qualified electors and town requirements are not
existent. Respondents therefore urge that the lower
court decision be affirmed and the case dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
CARL J. NEMELKA
SALT LAKE COUNTY
ATTORNEY
By ROBERT D. CROFTS
Deputy Salt Lake County
Attorney
Attorney for Respondents
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